Abstract
In this article, the philosophical and phenomenological limits of the idea of transferring human consciousness to a machine are examined. There are theories such as the Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW), the Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and the Whole Brain Emulation (WBE) that propose functional models of consciousness, however, it is argued that these approaches fail to capture its subjective, embodied, and affective dimensions. Through a dialogue between cognitive neuroscience, philosophy of mind, and phenomenology, it is maintained that consciousness is more than processed information: it is a lived, situated, and embodied experience. Therefore, it is argued that the complete transfer of consciousness into a machine is not unfeasible due to technical issues, but rather due to a reductionist understanding of the human condition. It is concluded that consciousness cannot be dissociated from the body or from lived historicity, without stripping it of its essence.